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IN THE SUPREME COURT O~ THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. 
regarding special fuel tax 
liability for the years of 
October 1973 to September 
1976, before the Utah State 
Tax Cornrnis-sion 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No._16797 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Second District Court's 
decision which set aside the order of the Utah State Tax Com-
mission which had required the respondent to pay the special fuel 
tax for and during the reconstruction of the road to Antelope 
Island. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Second District Court, sitting as the tax court, 
found that the fuel used by Plaintiff-Respondent (hereafter, 
Respondent) in the reconstruction of State Highway 127 from 
October 1, 1973 through September 30, 1976 was exempt from the 
special fuel tax under Utah Code Ann. (1953) §41-11-50. Pursuant 
to such a finding, the court set aside the Tax Commission's 
decision and order.which had required Respondent to pay the 
special fuel tax assessment made by the Tax Commission's staff. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's decision 
and a reinstatement of the Tax Corru~ission decision which imposed 
the special fuel tax on the fuel consumed in the reconstruction 
of State Road Number 127. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case was tried on the following stipulated facts: 
1. Parson Asphalt Products, Incorporated, is a Utah 
corporation duly ~ualified to do business in the State of Utah. 
2. Upon submitting the low bid for improving the quality 
and reconstruction of a highway between Route 108 in Syracuse, 
Utah and the north end of Antelope Island, known as State Highway 
127, Plaintiff was awarded a contract by the State of Utah. 
3. An audit of the plaintiff's records discovered untaxed 
purchases of "special fuel 11 consumed by the equipment of Parson 
during the reconstruction of State Highway 127. The Auditing 
Division of the State Tax Commission found a User Special Fuel 
Tax deficiency owned by plaintiff in the amount of $24,196.82 
including interest and penalty for the period beginning October 
1, 1973 through September 30, 1976. The plaintiff does not con-
test the amount of the tax shown on the audit if it is found 
not to be exempt from the tax. 
4. The Utah legislature designated and dedicated the 
road beginning at Route 108 in Syracuse, Utah, running easterly 
to the north end of Antelope Island as Route 127, a state highway, 
- 2 
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in Utah Code Ann. §27-12-56(b) in 1965 and it has been contin-
uously designated as a state highway since 1965 by Utah Code 
Ann . § 2 7-12- 4 3 . 1 ( 7 ) . 
5. Due to the severe conditions present on the Great Salt 
Lake, Route 127 was periodically washed out, ne~essitating ex-
tensive reconstruction, repair and maintenance work to seek to· 
maintain it ih a condition suitable for travel. Exhibits in the 
form of pictures taken in 1974 are representati~e of t~e condition 
of the highway during these periodic washouts. Parson's exhibit 
No. 10 shows that contract and maintenance work. 
6. Since the designation of Route 127 as a state highway 
in 1965, the highway has generally been suitable for passenger 
car travel for six to eight month intervals. In between those 
six to eight month intervals, repair work would become necessary 
to return the highway to a condition suitable for travel by 
passenger automobiles. 
7. The "special fuel" upon which the taxes involved in 
this proceeding were imposed was used in the operation of and/or 
to propel motor vehicles and the only issue to be decided by the 
court is whether the taxes were. properly imposed. 
8. This matter was heard by the State Tax Conunission on 
July 29, 1977 and the Conunission decided that the use of the 
plaintiff's vehicles was upon a public highway and denied the 
plaintiff's claim for an exemption from the special fuel tax. 
This appeal followed and proceeds under Utah Code Ann. §59-24-1, 
et seq, better known as the Tax Court Act. 
- 3 -
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9. In the performance of the contract the motor vehicles 
used by Parson were non-licensed. The state gave Parson per-
mission to use such equipment. Parson claims that this equipment 
was "off road" type and too large for highway use. 
10. The transcript of the proceedings had before the 
Commission on July 29, 1977 may be considered. (R. 17, 18) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SCOPE OF THE EXEMPTION FROM TAXA-
TION ON THE USE OF SPECIAL FUEL DOES 
NOT EXTEND TO PARSON IN THE INSTAi."l\JT 
CONTROVERSY. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-11-50(1), imposes a tax on the type 
of fuel used by Parson in the reconstruction of State Highway 
127 when it reads: 
A tax is hereby imposed at the rate of 
seven cents per gallon on the sale or use of 
special fuel, provided that the sale or use of 
special fuel for any purpose other than to operate 
or propel a motor vehicle upon the public highways 
of Utah shall be exempt from the application of 
this tax. 
The exemption as provided in this subsection 
shall apply only in those cases where the purchasers 
or the users of special fuel shall establish to the 
satisfaction of the cormnission that the special fuel 
purchased or used was used for purposes other than 
to operate or propel a motor vehicle upon the 
public highways of Utah. 
This section imposes a tax on the use of all special fuel. 
However, the legislature did provide a limited exemption from the 
application of the tax. As with all exemptions from taxation, 
the exemption specified in §41-11-50(1) is to be strictly con-
- 4 
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strued, since the release from the burden of such general statutes 
must be clearly shown and will not be inferred from the doubtful 
import of statutory language. In Re Simpson's Estate, 43 Cal .. 2d 
594, 275 P.2d 467 (1954); and 71 AI!l.Jur.2d State and Locai Taxa-
tion, §326. 
Focusing on the exempt1ion given by the legislature, we. 
find that use of the fuel for "any purpose other than to operate 
or propel a motor vehicle upon the public highways of Utah" is 
exempt. The legislature further provided the scope of the exemp-
tion to be limited to "only . . . those cases where the purchasers 
or the users of special fuel shall establish to the satisfaction 
of the commission that the special fuel purchased or-used was 
used for purposes other than to operate or propel a motor vehicle 
upon the public highways of Utah." (Emphasis added.) 
The power to tax and the subject of taxation is constitu-
tionally vested in th_e legislature and so is the power to exempt 
from taxation. The exemption must be clearly defined and founded 
upon the plain language of the enactment which grants it, without 
doubt or ambiguity and will not be aided by judicial interpreta-
tion. 71 Am.Jur.2d, State and Local Taxation, §326; see also, 
Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 P.961 (1901), to the same effect; 
applying the rule to property tax exemptions. By its own plain 
terms, §41-11-50 states the exemption from the tax on special fuel 
arises and exists "only in those cases" where the party seeking 
exemption establishes a right to the exemption "to the satisfac-
tion of the commission." . Stipulation of Facts, No. 8, states 
- 5 -
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that Parson Asphalt Products did not qualify for the exemption 
because the Commission found that the use of the special fuel 
by Parson was not for purpos~s other than to operate or propel 
a motor vehicle upon the public highways of Utah. Notwithstand-
ing the above, Appellant realizes that the Commission must act 
reasonably and not arbitrarily or capriciously in carrying out 
its duties under this statute. The following discussion will 
demonstrate that the Commission did not act arbitrarily, but 
rather, in the only way the statutes governing the situation would 
allow. 
_Parson attempts to take advantage of the exemption by claim-
ing that the vehicles used on the road which is the subject of the 
audit were "off road" type vehicles and by claiming that the 
v:ehicles were not used on a "public highway." The first argument 
is untenable as "road" vs. "off-road" use is immaterial to the 
taxation issue due to the fact that the statute imposes the tax 
on the use of special fuel to "operate or propel a motor vehicle." 
Utah Code Ann. §41-ll-49(a) defines the term "motor vehicle," 
as it is to be used in §41-11-50 as follows: 
(a) Motor vehicle shall·mean and include 
every self-propelled vehicle operated upon a 
highway. (Emphasis added.) 
As all of the vehicles used by Parson which were the sub-
ject of the Tax Commission audit were self-prop~lled, the only 
real issue to be resolved in the exemption decision is whether 
the Parson vehicles were operated or propelled on the public 
highways of Utah. 
- 6 -
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Section 41-11-50(1) provides in· two separate paragraphs 
that in order to obtain exemption, the parties must prove the use 
to have been other than on the 11 public highways" of Utah. The 
term "public highways 11 is not defined in the motor fuels section, 
but it is defined in the Highway Code; Utah Code Ann. §27-12-2, 
et seq. Section 27-12-2(8) prbvides: 
• 
11 Public Highway" means any road, street 
alley, lane, court, place, viaduct, tunnel, cul-
vert, or bridge laid out or erected as such by 
the public, or dedicated or abandoned to the 
public . . . ·. (Emphasis added.) 
Combined, §41-11-50(1) and §27-12-2(8) mandates, as a 
matter of law, that the fuel consumed while operating a motor 
vehicle upon the road to Antelope Island be subjected to the 
special fuel tax. ·This follows since the legislature dedicated 
this roadway as a public road in 1965 when it enacted Utah ·code 
Ann. §27-12-43.1 and created State Highway No. 127. 
The above sta~utory provisions are fatal to any claim of 
exemption under the terms of the Utah Use Fuel Tax Act of 1941. 
This is reinforced when reference is made to Utah Code Ann. 
§41-ll-49(c) which states: 
Highway shall mean and include every way 
or place, of whatever nature, generally open to 
the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular 
travel notwithstanding that the same may be tempo-
rarily closed for the purpos~ of construction, 
reconstruction, maintenance or repair. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Applying these various principles to the facts, we find 
that Parson operated self-propelled motor vehicles on a roadway 
dedicated to public use which was periodically closed until 
- 7 -
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necessary construction and repair work could be done to restore 
the road to its normal passable condition. 
Parson's arguments that its self-propelled motor vehicles · 
were of the off-road type, and were used on a road which woulo 
become washed out and impassable for a four to six-month.period 
each year are simply ineffective in seeking exemption under the 
provisions of the Utah Code governing the audit situation. Appel-
lant submits that this would be the case even if this court were 
not under the obligation to strictly construe the statute which 
Parson claims grants the exemption against such exemption. 
_The best Parson could argue under these provisions is that 
the dedicated public road, State Highway No. 127, became impas-
sable for a four to six-month period thereby becoming closed to. 
the use of the public during that period and thus ceased to be a 
highway for purposes of the Utah Use Fuel Tax Act of 1941. This 
argument fails to meet the test used by the courts in deciding 
whether an exemption from taxation will be extended. The test 
being ~ plain, unambiguous, unmistakable language establishing 
\ 
the exemption without the aid of judicial interpretation. In 
the instant controversy, there is simply no way to construe the 
"non-highway" argument made by Parson as such a clear statement 
by the legislature. This follows when the accompanying text from 
whence the argument comes is viewed. Section 41-ll-40(c) cited 
abo~e, states that every way or place, of whatever nature, gener-
ally open to the .use of the public for vehicular travel is a 
highway for purposes of the fuel act. Appellant maintains that 
- 8 ·-
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this is easily interpreted as an at~empt to envelope all types 
of roads, even trails which have just been pioneered by hunters, 
etc. If the way or place is open to use by the public with 
vehicles, it is a highway for purposes of this act. The all in-
clusive intent is further manifested by the lan_guage "notwith-
standing that the same may be' temporarily closed for the purpose 
of construct1on, reconstruction, maintenance or repair." This 
entire provision seems directed at and includin~ witni~ its coverage, 
all places in Utah whereon a motor vehicle may be operated by the 
public even if under construction or repair. 
Likewise, the use of the term "public highway" in light 
of its expansive definition as contained in §27-12-2(8), supra, 
seems to indicate an intent to include roads which have merely 
been dedicated to public use within the purview of this statute. 
In summary, the road to Antelope Island was a public high-
way for purposes of Qtah Code Ann. §41-11-50(1) for the follow-
ing reasons: First, the roadway was dedicated to the public as 
a state highway in 1965 (See U.C.A. §27-12-2(8)). Second, it 
was erected and maintained as a roadway by the public for many 
years prior to the commencement of work by Parson. Finally, even 
prior to the commencement of work by Parson, the road was gener-
ally open to public ·use as it was capable of travel by passenger 
automobiles for a six to eight-month period each and every year. 
Applying the statutes governing the instant controversy to the 
above facts leads to the conclusion that the special fuel consumed 
in rebuilding the highway. to Antelope Island was subject to taxa-
- 9 -
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tion. A fortiori, when all of the above is considered in light 
of the fundamental legal principle that exemptions from taxation 
are to be strictly construed with all doubts construed against 
the one claiming exemption, there can be no other conclusion r~ached 1 
than that the assessment of the special fuel tax was lawfully pro-
per as.mandated by the legislature of Utah. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
ROADWAY IN QUESTION WAS A TOTALLY NEW 
ROAD IS IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THE 
STIPULATION OF FACTS GO\TERNING THIS 
CASE. 
In the trial court's Memorandum Decision, it was stated 
that the new plan of constructing the roadway to Antelope Island 
was so grossly different than the original plan, that a reasonable 
mind cannot characterize it other than as the construction of a 
totally new road (R.20). In the Conclusions of Law section of 
the trial court's Memorandum Decision, the court expands on this 
finding by-stating that no reasonable mind could find other than 
that the fuel used during the construction period was not used 
upon the public roads. The court continued by concluding that 
State Highway No. 127 did not come into existence until it was 
constructed by the Respondent contractor. 
Such findings and conclusions are totally erroneous and 
contradict the parties' Stipulation of Facts. Paragraph 2 of the 
stipulation reads: 
Upon submitting the low bid for improvinq 
and reconstruction of a highway between Route i,~g 
in Syracuse, Utah and the north end of ~ntelope 
- 10 --
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Island, known as State Highway 127 Plaintiff 
( I ) - I Parson s was awarded a contract by the State 
of Utah." (Emphasis added.) (R.17) 
Paragraph 3 states that the audit assessment was for "pur-
chases of 'special fuel' consumed by the equipment of Parson 
during the reconstruction of State Highway 127 .. - .. 11 (R.17) 
Paragraphs 4 and 5 als;o take for granted that it was the 
reconstruction, albeit major reconstruction, but reconstruction 
nonetheless, of an existing public highway know~ before and after 
the reconstruction as State Highway 127. (R. 17,18) 
Testifying before the Tax Commission, Mr. Mark Wilson, a 
Parson's engineer, stated that a supplemental agreement was entered 
into between the state and Parson. This supplemental agreement 
provided for the repair of the existing road to a sufficient con-
di tiondi tion so that its equipment could travel from the main-
land to the island (R.74,75). 
The trial cou~t's Findings and Conclusions that Parson's 
construction work on State Highway 127 was construction of a 
' 
"totally new road" flies in the face of the facts, both as they 
existed and as stipulated. 
This erroneously conclusion was apparently the trial 
court's basis for reversing the Tax Commission in its finding of 
taxability. This is apparent when one reads the last two sen-
tneces of the trial court's decision. They read: 
The Court views this project factually, 
and as a totally new right-of-way. The ~ourt 
therefore rules as a matter of law that it 
follows that the fuel utilized in the con-
struction is not taxable. 
- 11 -
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Appellant submits that the case on appeal is one wherein 
the trial court has rendered a decision which manifestly misapplied 
the facts and made a finding clearly against the weight of the 
'd 1 evi ence. As this is the case, appellant urges this court to 
reverse the trial court and find that the special fuel consumed 
in the reconstruction of State Highway 127 was fuel used to 
operate or propel·a motor vehicle upon a public highway which 
mandates the payment of the special fuel tax. 
CONCLUSION 
The scope of the exemption from taxation on the use of 
speciai fuel is very narrow, and in the words of the statute 
applies "only in those cases where the purchasers or the users of 
special fuel shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commission 
that the special fuel purchased or used was used for purposes other 
than to operate or propel a motor vehicle upon the public high-
I 
ways of Utah." Both informal and formal hearings were had before 
the Tax Commission where the Respondent fully presented its 
views. However, the Tax Commission was not convinced that the 
use of the fuel was other than on the public highways and imposed 
the special fuel tax. As exemptions must be clearly defined and 
will not be aided by judicial interpretation, the exemption simply 
does not apply to Parson and the only inquiry should be whether 
the Tax Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in so 
finding that the special fuel was used on a public highway. 
1 For cases t~1erein this court has been willincr to reverse the 
lower court ~~ to it~ findinas of fact see J~well v. Horner, 
12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594 (1961) citing Jensen v. Ho~eli, 
75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034; Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah 468, 175 P.2d 
470. b 
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The Commission did not act arbitrarily as is demonstrated 
by reference to the laws governing this case. Section 41-11-50 
imposes a tax on the sale or use of special fuel for the operation 
and propelling of motor vehicles upon the public highways of Utah. 
"Motor vehicle" is defined by §41-ll-49(a) as follows: 
Motor vehicle shall mean and include every 
self-p!opelled vehicle operated upon a highway. · 
Paragraph (c) of §49 defines "highway" as follows: 
Highway shall mean and ihclude ev~ry way 
or place, of whatever nature, generally open to the 
use of the public for the purpose of vehicular 
travel notwithstanding that the same may be tem-
porarily closed for the purpose of construction, 
reconstruction, maintenance or repair. 
Thus, it can be seen that the scope of the exemption is very 
narrow indeed as the word "highway" is very broadly defined as 
"every way or place, of whatever nature." It was further narrowed 
by the definition of "highway" which states that such a highway 
remains a highway notwithstanding that it was "temporarily closed 
for the purpose of construction, reconstruction, maintenance 
or repair. 11 
The lower court's decision was based a conclusion that 
the construction of State Highway 127 during the period of this 
audit, was the construction of a totally new road. This is 
totally in contravention of the Stipulation of Facts and facts 
as they existed, and this alone should be cause for reversal of 
the lower court's decision because without that conclusion, 
there is no basis for the decision. 
Appellant respectfully requests this court to reverse 
the trial court so that the special fuel tax may be imposed on 
- 13 -
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the fuel consumed during and for the reconstruction of State 
Highway 127 from Syracuse to Antelope Island. 
DATED this 11th day o~ February, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
l/l/41;t}f(l 'U?!' it . 
HARK K. BUCHI 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Defendant-Appellant Utah State Tax Conunission were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to LaVar E. Stark, Attorney at Law, 2651 Washington 
Blvd., Suite No. 10, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 11th day of 
February, 1980. 
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